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Book Reviews
Recent Works on Afghanistan
Afghantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979-89
By Rodric Braithwaite

Reviewed by Ali A. Jalali, Distinguished Professor at the Near East South Asia
Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense University, former Interior
Minister of Afghanistan and author of several books on Afghan military history

T

he Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the decade-long
military operation of the Russian forces in the remote Central Asian
country has been the subject of numerous studies focused on how the
Soviet Army fought and lost the asymmetric war against the Westernbacked Afghan Mujahedin guerrillas. The US-led military intervention in
Afghanistan, in the wake of the 9/11 al Qaeda-linked terrorist attacks
in the United States from bases in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, has
spurred renewed interest in studying the military history of the turbulent
land, particularly the Soviet war against the Afghan resistance in the 1980s.
Rodric Braithwaite’s Afghantsy: the Russians in Afghanistan, 1979-89 is
one of the latest books on the subject and the most comprehensive story
of the Soviet experience in Afghanistan. The author uses a variety of
primary sources, which are all listed with full citations in the order of
presentation at the end of the volume. As it is based almost exclusively
on Russian sources, it is, in fact, the Russian perspective of the drawnout conflict. From the Soviets’ “road to Kabul” to their entanglement in
the “disasters of war” and eventually to “the long goodbye,” Braithwaite
walks the reader through the minutiae of the Soviet soldiers’ saga, for
the most part in their own words. It is a story of how the Soviet leadership, its military, and individual servicemen behaved in the face of a
difficult situation. Further, the tome exemplifies the effect of the brutal
war on Soviet soldiers, their families, and the Russian public at large.
The author shares the common assertion of Soviet military historians that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was defensive in nature and
aimed at ending a “chaotic situation” in the Soviet Union’s immediate
neighborhood. However, the author acknowledges the invasion came
against a backdrop of a long history of Russian interests in Afghanistan.
“It took the Russians two hundred and fifty years to go to Kabul,” he
writes. The ambition to expand southward in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and efforts to secure its frontiers against “undesirable
neighbors” and protect the pacified areas from lawless tribes beyond them
have long been the hallmark of Russian strategy in the greater Central
Asia and Afghanistan. Afghanistan was the ultimate prize of the Great
Game that the Russian and British empires played in the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries and served as a peaceful battleground for the
East-West ideological battle during the Cold War. The author takes note
of a number of previous irritations in Russo-Afghan relations following
the Russian conquest of Central Asia: Russian troops’ encroachment on
the Afghan territory in 1885 and capture of Panjdeh—a border town
between Herat and Marv; the Red Army’s furious pursuit of Central
Asian rebels across the Afghan border in the 1920s; and Stalin’s military
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intervention in northern Afghanistan in 1929 to support the beleaguered
Afghan King Amanullah.
The bloody Communist coup of 27 April 1978, was led by the
Moscow-backed People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA),
overthrew the Daud regime, and opened the way for wider involvement of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. But, as General Lyakhovski,
a Soviet chronicler of the war and an Afghan war veteran, was quoted
as saying: the April coup was the beginning of “tragedy not only for
Afghanistan but for the Soviet Union as well.” Although Braitwaite does
not see reliable evidence that the Russians were behind the coup, the
PDPA leaders were closely linked to the Soviet Committee for State
Security (KGB) since the early 1950s and were under Soviet control.
Whatever role the Soviet Union did or did not play in staging the coup,
the Communist takeover was not the immediate reason to put in motion
the forthcoming Soviet invasion of the country. The actual milestone of
the intervention came in March 1979 with the explosion of violence in
Herat. The anti-Soviet uprising took a heavy toll on Soviet citizens and
thousands of Afghans who died in the rebellion and its aftermath.
The author offers a compelling analysis that although the Afghan
government was able to put down the Herat uprising, “a slow burning fuse
had been lit,” leading to the invasion nine months later. Following the
Herat disturbance, the Soviet leaders rejected the Afghan government’s
persistent requests for the deployment of Soviet troops to counter rising
insurgency. During the next several months, unrest and armed resistance
continued to spread throughout the country. The author particularly
highlights the infighting within the PDPA which grew increasingly
bloody until it culminated in September with PDPA General Secretary
Nur Mohammad Taraki’s murder by Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin.
As Braithwaite writes, the murder of Taraki, a Brezhnev favorite, was the
last straw and led to the mood in Moscow shifting in favor of military
intervention to depose Amin and install a more reliable Afghan leader.
The choice was Barak Karmal, the leader of the Parcham dissident
faction within the PDPA who was living in exile in Eastern Europe.
Meanwhile, Soviet military preparation for contingencies started as early
as April 1979 with several special purpose units deployed to Afghanistan
between April and September.
In pursuance of the Soviet General Staff classification, the author
divides the conduct of the Soviet war into four phases: the invasion
(December 1979-February 1980), military operations to pacify the
country (March 1980-April 1985), Afghanization of the war (April 1985end of 1986), and the withdrawal (November 1986-February 1989). The
nature of combat action, structure of forces, command and control
issues, and level of cooperation with Afghan government forces are
outlined in each phase. The study is rich with the personal experiences
of the Soviet fighters and brief on actual military operations, which are
mostly anecdotal. It reviews only two large-scale operations in detail:
the Panjsher Operation in 1984 and Zhawar/Magestral Operation in
1985-86 in Paktia-Khost provinces.
Braithwaite’s chapter on “Nation Builders” is the most unconvincing part of the book. In line with official Soviet assertions, the author
gives the impression the occupiers were involved in nation-building
projects even while the war against the Afghan resistance was ongoing.
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However, the amount of Soviet building effort pales in comparison
with the destruction caused by the occupation. This period would be
better described as nation spoiling than nation building. High on the
delusion of revolutionary makeover of a traditional society, the “nationbuilding” project was ideologically driven and, as the author agrees, was
an “ultimately futile attempt to build socialism.” The Soviets and their
Afghan allies were so out of touch with the realities of Afghan society
that President Taraki told a visiting Soviet official in July 1978 to “come
back in a year, by which time the mosques would be empty.” What actually happened was the opposite—protesting attempts to impose alien
values on them, most Afghans moved closer to their Islamic faith—a
shift eventually exploited by religious extremists to influence the political scene. The occupiers were determined to destroy the socio-political
system the resistance was tried to preserve.
The author provides many examples of the brutality of Soviet soldiers who deliberately killed members of the civilian population. Yet the
author sounds apologetic by asserting that civilian casualties during the
civil war of the 1990s and the American-backed campaign to expel the
Taliban in 2001, “equaled, if not exceeded, the horrors that occurred
between 1979 and 1989.” On the contrary, during the civil war the
number of civilians killed was estimated in tens of thousands, while conservative estimates by the United Nations and Amnesty International of
Afghan deaths during the Soviet war are over one million. The Soviets
never attempted counterinsurgency but made efforts to destroy the rural
areas to deny sanctuaries to the resistance and force the population to
move to major cities for easier control or to drive them into exile. Twenty
percent of the Afghan population (more than five million people) was
driven into exile in Pakistan and Iran during the Soviet conflict.
Since the study draws heavily on Russian sources and narratives, it
emphasizes the Soviet experience of the war, thus limiting the Afghan
perspective and misrepresenting certain realities. The book offers the
most comprehensive and useful details of how the Soviet Union became
entangled in the Afghan imbroglio, why it decided to invade, how it
fought the Afghan resistance, and how and when it made the decision
under Gorbachev’s leadership in 1986 to leave. However, when the study
does reference the Afghan narrative, it often makes ill-founded assertions based on historical inaccuracies. The references on the Afghan
Mujahedin forces are the most disappointing part of the book. They are
impaired by unrealistic assessment.
The author’s dash through Afghan history and culture is also replete
with factual errors and problematic interpretations about the political
system of Afghanistan and its ethnic issues. One of the most serious
mistakes is to list the Taraki-Amin crackdown on the Karmal-led
Parcham faction as having occurred in 1979; it actually took place a
year earlier in the summer of 1978. Barak Karmal was not a Pashtun.
Anahita Ratebzad was not the first Afghan woman appointed to a senior
political position under the Communists as the author asserts; there
were many women serving as cabinet ministers, parliament members
and other senior officials in the 1960s and 1970s before the Communist
takeover. Tashkent is in Uzbekistan, not Turkmenistan; Yakub, the head
of the Afghan Army under Amin was not Amin’s son-in-law nor was
Ahmad Akbar, the security chief, his cousin; and the 40th Army was
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under the Turkistan Military District, not the Turkmenistan Military
District. Shaving the heads of Afghan recruits is not against the Afghan
culture. The 21 February 1979, demonstration in Kabul was a spontaneous public uprising, not an event staged by an American Central
Intelligence Agency agent. There has never been an Anglican Church
in Afghanistan near the Pakistani border. Soviet prisoners were never
incarcerated in the Afghan Pul-e Charkhi Prison. The author’s acceptance of the Soviets’ claims that despite the brutalities they committed
the Soviet soldiers “got on with the Afghan population rather well—
better than the NATO soldiers who succeeded them” is incongruous.
Finally, throughout the book Afghan geographic names are inaccurately
transliterated from Russian into English. “Punjsher,” a well-known location has been distortedly spelled as “Pandsher.”
Despite the various inaccuracies, Afghantsy: the Russians in Afghanistan,
1979-89 has its own merits and is the best available source for a comprehensive account of the Soviet experience in Afghanistan. No doubt
the study dispels many myths of the Cold War and clarifies many unanswered questions about the Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan
during the 1980s. However, because of its exclusive focus on the Soviet
side of the story, it does spawn many misrepresentations about the realities of the Afghan battleground where the Soviet-Mujahedin struggle
was played out. For a more balanced view, this book should be read
along with other studies such as Peter Tomsen’s The Wars of Afghanistan:
Messianic Terrorism, Tribal Conflicts, and the Failures of Great Powers.

Operation Anaconda: America’s First Major Battle
in Afghanistan
by Lester W. Grau and Dodge Billingsley

Reviewed by Colonel Robert M. Cassidy, US Army, a military professor at the
US Naval War College, served as a special assistant to the operational commander in Afghanistan in 2010-11
University Press of Kansas,
Lawrence, Kansas, 2011
459 pages
$39.95

L

es Grau and Dodge Billingsley offer keen insight in their historical
account of Operation Anaconda. Both authors are eminently qualified to write such a book. Les Grau is an Afghanistan expert and has
written prolifically about the Soviet-Afghan War. Dodge Billingsley is a
daring combat journalist who covered the first Russian-Chechen War of
1994-96 and was on the ground in the Shar-i Kot Valley during Operation
Anaconda. This book focuses on the tactical level, much like Grau’s earlier
work The Bear Went over the Mountain. This poorly planned and executed
operation shines a light on the conspicuously regrettable arrogance
and ignorance engendered in the Pentagon and US Central Command
during the first years of the Afghan War. The detailed anatomy of the
March 2002 debacle in the Shar-i Kot Valley is an enduring testimony to
strategic failure of significant magnitude mainly because various officials
and planners in the Pentagon did not comprehend or plan for any longterm outcome in Afghanistan or Pakistan. To be certain, in the 2001-02
period, US military thinking, doctrine, and organization were focused
almost exclusively on potential adversaries. Ultimately, this book recalls
the fundamental risks in engaging in wars without fully understanding
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the enemy, our own capabilities, and the type of conflict we were about
to enter into.
The book’s beginning includes a cogent quote attributed to Field
Marshal William Slim: “preparation for war is an expensive, burdensome
business, yet there is one important part of it that costs little—study.”
This aptly sets the context for Operation Anaconda; there were few people
in the US defense community in early 2002 who knew much about
Afghanistan or about fighting irregular forces in the Hindu Kush. As a
result, the Pentagon and CENTCOM failed to understand and apply the
many lessons from the Soviet-Afghan War. The United States undertook
the early Afghan War with too few forces and ad hoc and convoluted
command and control arrangements. The leadership in the Pentagon
mistakenly inferred the Soviets had failed in Afghanistan because they
had committed too many forces. A large part of the explanation for the
Soviets’ failure, however, was that they had too few of the right type of
forces, fought with the wrong tactics, and were hamstrung by a convoluted command and control. Anaconda was, to a degree, a metaphor
for the first eight years of the war—years that saw forces employing
untenable tactics encumbered by ludicrously complicated command
and control arrangements. Anaconda violated almost every axiom that
students of military art and science learn. It was an ad hoc and poorly
planned fight, with terrible interservice coordination, abysmal command
and control, and far too few forces. In fact, these forces essentially occupied the enemy’s engagement area in a disastrously piecemeal manner.
Operation Anaconda does a good job of detailing the poor command
and control interservice coordination between the Army and the US
Air Force, and the almost cavalier attitude that characterized a number
of the Sea, Air, Land (SEAL) teams. These self-imposed obstacles to
effective military operations combined with the inexorable friction and
fog of combat to make Operation Anaconda a close-call in terms of
which side was victorious. It was really only the audacity and tenacity
of some very good junior and mid-level tactical leaders that prevented
the operation from becoming a debacle. The alarming and incredible
insight that comes from this account is how closely many of the mistakes in the battle mirrored the blunders evident in Operation Urgent
Fury in Grenada two decades earlier. Similar operational omissions and
errors that cost lives in Grenada were repeated. It was the experience
of Grenada that precipitated the US Goldwater-Nichols Department of
Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Indeed, this legislation’s primary
purpose was to improve joint command and control and cooperation
among the services, and between special and conventional forces. Yet,
16 years after Goldwater-Nichols, identical command and control blunders and fratricidal gaffes were repeated in a remote Afghan valley.
The positive side of this story is that since that forsaken battle, now
almost a decade ago, the current campaign, resources, and leadership in
Afghanistan are the best since the war began in October 2001. The combined operations of coalition and Afghan forces have taken away the
Taliban’s momentum and sustained unambiguous gains, having driven
the Taliban out of key areas and safe havens in places like Helmand
and Kandahar. Even still, command, control, and interoperability of
the services, conventional forces, and all types of special operations
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forces, have truly witnessed unprecedented effectiveness and lethalness
in places like the Helmand River Valley.
This reviewer needs to make two final points. One is that this book
comes with an excellent documentary assembled by the authors. This
video amplifies some interesting facets of the operation and is a useful
supplement to the book. The second aspect is there are some factual
errors in the book. An example appears in the beginning of the book
where it mistakes the date for Pakistan’s 1971 war with India as 1973.
Another example is an error that lists the date of the 1991 Persian Gulf
War to repel Saddam Hussein’s forces from Kuwait as 1981 (on page
47). Finally, in the concluding chapter, the authors claim that until this
battle, the US military had not had a major fight in more than a decade.
But the October 1993 Battle of Mogadishu was a major battle of commensurate intensity resulting in a number of casualties and deaths.
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New Scholarship on the Fall of South Vietnam
KONTUM: The Battle to Save South Vietnam
By Thomas P. McKenna

Reviewed by Sean N. Kalic, is an Associate professor in the Department of
Military History at the US Army Command and General Staff College and the
author of US President and the Militarization of Space 1946-1967

T

homas McKenna in Kontum writes a thorough and insightful account
about the Easter Offensive launched by the North Vietnamese in
Spring 1972. McKenna rightfully asserts that the massive operation conducted by the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) was the largest military
offensive since the Chinese incursion across the Yalu River in Korea in
October 1950. Furthermore, he makes the argument that the NVA launched
the massive invasion “because they thought that the Vietnamization was
succeeding.” Additionally, he makes a very strong point that this major
combat action took place as President Nixon announced a reduction of
20,000 troops in Vietnam. This point becomes significant as McKenna
highlights the fact that no US ground forces participated in the fight. So
as to not confuse the point, McKenna provides a detailed discussion of
the role of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MAVC) advisors in
the Easter Offensive. In addition, McKenna, who was an Army of the
Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) advisor in Kontum, highlights the role the
United States Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and Army aviation assets
played in the fight to blunt and repel the North’s attack. For McKenna the
triumph of ARVN and US advisors during the Easter Offensive serves
as a critical success within the larger public understanding of Vietnam as
a failure, especially in the post Tet Offensive period.
To advance his sound and well-supported argument, McKenna
focuses on providing the reader with a detailed understanding of the
overall strategic situation in Vietnam in the spring of 1972. In addition
to balancing the demands of the desire of the United States to withdraw
and significantly reduce its military commitments to South Vietnam,
while preparing and building ARVN forces for the eventual overall
withdrawal of all US forces, McKenna skillfully elaborates on the tactical
capabilities and organization of the NVA. For McKenna, a significant
point is that the North Vietnamese Army was equipped with weapons
from the Soviet Union and China. The NVA possessed modern T-54
tanks and shoulder-fired SA-7 anti-aircraft surface-to-air missiles. Yet
these modern advancements contrasted with the recruiting needs of
the NVA which required harsh impressment tactics to build the necessary manpower to launch the North Vietnamese invasion. Beyond just
providing statistics and commentary on the nature of the NVA prior to
the invasion, the chapters in which McKenna presents these significant
points become critical to understanding that the war in 1972 was far from
over and that despite the typical narrative that ARVN could not stand
and fight, he highlights that they did with the support of US air power.
McKenna’s analysis is spot-on and at times almost seems to provide
some hope that the South Vietnamese can ultimately defend themselves
against the expanding capabilities and strength of the NVA. However,
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McKenna is quick to note that these hopeful sentiments are quickly tempered by the reality that ARVN forces range from totally incompetent to
very capable and strong fighting units. The main problem he points out
was that South Vietnam failed to have a unified and committed military
that could readily defend itself against additional attacks from the North
without the aid of the United States. In the end, he conveys a tragic story
in which the eventual downfall of South Vietnam is inevitable.
Although McKenna’s objective is to highlight the actions that took
place at Kontum, he also provides a general overview of the entire Easter
Offensive as it raged in the II and III Corps across South Vietnam. Even
though McKenna admits that his book is not a complete history of the
Easter Offensive and he strives to present only enough information to
understand its context, he does indeed end up providing a very strong
understanding of the situation in South Vietnam in the spring of 1972.
However, as a result of his intent, McKenna leaves the reader wanting a
more comprehensive account of the actions taking place in other areas.
To satisfy this wish, it would be best to read McKenna’s book in conjunction with Abandoning Vietnam and An Loc by James H. Willbanks.
Willbanks, who also served as a US Army advisor in Vietnam during the
Easter Offensive, provides a thorough understanding of the broad military and political context in Abandoning Vietnam, and a specific history of
the battle of An Loc, which took place during the Easter Offensive as
well. In many ways these two additional works provide complementary
material to McKenna’s and reinforce his overall thesis. Together, these
works provide a comprehensive understanding of the nature of the war
in Vietnam at a time when many people did not realize that a significant conventional military fight was occurring. This is not to say that
McKenna’s work does not stand on its own but rather, in conjunction
with the works written by Willbanks, the reader gets a more detailed
understanding of the overall significance of the Easter Offensive in the
history of the US involvement in Vietnam.
Beyond being just a history of the Battle of Kontum, McKenna’s
well-written and balanced account provides exceptional insights in the
NVA, ARVN, and the withering commitment of the United States.
Kontum deserves serious attention by people interested in understanding the political, military, and tactical history of the major conventional
operations that took place in the Spring of 1972. In the end, McKenna
impressively supports his thesis. He logically argues that although the
NVA launched the Easter Offensive to end Nixon’s presidency, break
the willingness of ARVN to continue fighting, and test the commitment
of US air power, they failed to achieve any of their objectives. They were
ultimately forced to negotiate with the United States, while refitting and
rebuilding for their invasion in 1975 which was ultimately successful.
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Black April: The Fall of South Vietnam, 1973-75
By George J. Veith

Reviewed by Dr. William J. Gregor, Professor of Social Sciences at the School of
Advanced Military Studies, US Army Command and General Staff College

B

lack April: The Fall of South Vietnam, 1973-75 is the first of two
volumes in which the author, George J. Veith, intends to provide
a comprehensive analysis of the last two years of the war in Vietnam.
This first book covers the military aspects of South Vietnam’s defeat
and addresses five critical questions: (1) when did the North Vietnamese
decide to renew the war; (2) how did they disguise their decision and
construct a surprise assault on Ban Me Thuot; (3) why did President
Nguyen Van Thieu withdraw his regular military forces from the Central
Highlands; (4) what triggered South Vietnam’s fall militarily in 55 days;
and (5) was the South Vietnamese military inept? The second volume will
discuss the political and diplomatic efforts to implement the Paris Peace
Accords and the social and economic events that had a profound impact
on the war. Given the length and detail of this military account it was
probably necessary to divide the work into two volumes. Unfortunately,
limiting this volume’s scope to military decisions, actions, and events
prevents the author from presenting a totally convincing explanation of
South Vietnam’s collapse. Readers might supplement their understanding
of this excellent volume by reading Dr. Henry Kissinger’s Ending the War
in Vietnam while awaiting volume two.
Although many books explaining the fall of South Vietnam have
been published, most of them date to the 1980s and none of their
authors could take advantage of recently declassified documents, both
American and North Vietnamese, that detail high-level decisionmaking.
George Veith has exploited the newly available archive materials along
with translations of North and South Vietnamese published general and
unit histories, and interviews with the senior military participants. For
example, his bibliography lists memoirs published in Vietnamese after
2000, and an account of the fall of the Saigon government through South
Vietnamese documents published in 2010. Mr. Veith acknowledges in
the introduction the problems that arise with the use of Communist
official histories and the skepticism needed when trying to use journals published by Republic of Vietnam military associations. However,
when the author deals with high-level military decisions and orders to
subordinate commands, the text is usually drawn directly from archival
documents and messages. Regrettably, the reader might not notice this
because quotations taken from documents sometimes appear between
quotation marks, other times in block quotes.
Despite the author’s claim, Black April is more a detailed, narrative
account of military actions, events, and decisions than a clinical analysis
of those decisions or an explanation of the events. This fact does not
diminish the value of the book because it allows readers to interpret the
facts themselves and mitigates what some might consider this book’s
anticommunist bias. However, it does mean that some evidence a reader
might expect in a military history is not present in the book. For example,
despite the fact that 72 percent of the book deals with the 55 days of the
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Great Spring Offensive, there is no detailed assessment of the overall
availability of supplies, repair parts, operational ready rates of aircraft,
or air and sea lift capabilities. The impact on operations of those factors
are discussed in the accounts of various battles and actions, but absent
that aggregate data, the assessments about the impact of those factors on
military capability are qualitative and relatively subjective. Nevertheless,
the author’s judgments are reasonable given his account.
Following Mr. Veith’s historical account may initially be difficult
for anyone not familiar with the Vietnam War or Vietnam’s geography.
The author succeeds in presenting the military situation and military
decisions from the perspectives of both the North and South Vietnamese, and, where applicable, the American perspective. He does this by
discussing operations in each corps or front area and by weaving back
and forth in time and in ever-shorter time periods. Thus, for example,
the text might discuss North Vietnamese operations in II Corps from 12
to 15 March, then visit politburo decisions in Hanoi during that period,
and then turn to South Vietnamese tactical actions in II Corps in the
same period. Paying close attention to the shifting time periods is an
absolute must. Some readers may also find keeping track of Vietnamese
place-names daunting. Fourteen maps aid the reader, but even though
they are very well designed, the reader might still wish to use the Internet to supplement the maps. Fortunately, the author’s clear style and
skillful weaving of the full account will ultimately result in the reader
being able to assemble a clear picture of the campaign and the military
commanders. Veterans and students of the Vietnam War will find the
detail rewarding.
Many of those who will read this book never experienced either the
Vietnam War or the acrimonious antiwar political debate. The passage
of time has undoubtedly faded the memories of the military veterans
and antiwar activists. Removed from the heated arguments of the time
and armed with currently available documentary evidence, many of the
assessments made in the 1970s appear foolish or naïve. For example,
congressional Democrats called for formation of a coalition government containing communists as a precondition for peace. However, in
the event a coalition government formed, North Vietnam’s politburo
planned to use it to infiltrate and overthrow the government of South
Vietnam. The American left argued that the Saigon government suppressed the will of the people and absent the dictatorial Thieu regime,
the South Vietnamese would quickly reconcile with the North. However,
nowhere were the advancing Communist forces greeted as liberators and
in the few instances when the Communist forces called for local populations to rise up, they refused. Democrat members of Congress opposing
assistance to South Vietnam appear to have been dupes of the North
Vietnamese regime because they argued that cutting off aid to South
Vietnam would bring President Thieu and the North Vietnamese to the
bargaining table. They were not aware that in April 1973, Le Duan and
General Vo Nguyen Giap had formed a secret committee to plan the
conquest of South Vietnam within a two-year period. Every congressional denial of aid reinforced the North’s determination to conquer South
Vietnam by force and by October 1973, the return to military struggle
was finalized and the small political-struggle faction silenced. After that
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decision, the North Vietnamese government adjusted its public posture
to reinforce the empty arguments in the US Congress.
Black April makes clear that the military forces of South Vietnam
were neither inept nor cowardly and that during the Great Spring
Offensive they often got the better of their North Vietnamese opponents tactically. Unfortunately, the effect of two years of active North
Vietnamese preparations and of declining military aid to South Vietnam
could not be reversed. The Paris Peace Treaty in January 1973 had
created military planning constraints that a South Vietnamese government could not ignore if it hoped to obtain much needed American
assistance. Adhering to those constraints led President Thieu to deploy
his forces in positions where they could not be easily extracted or supported. Thus, when North Vietnamese tanks and artillery attacked and
seized Ban Me Thuot in March 1975, the South Vietnamese government
had neither the forces required to regain the city, nor the reserves nor
transportation needed to cover a withdrawal. The South Vietnamese
army might have fared better by stoutly defending its forward positions,
but to what avail? The United States Congress had abandoned the US
commitment to South Vietnam. Absent US assistance, the government
of South Vietnam could not prevail. This detailed military account of
the final days of South Vietnam provides a valuable correction to previous accounts. Given the numerous myths that have been perpetuated
within the military about the Vietnam War, Black April is a must read for
serving soldiers and Marines.
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New Perspectives on World War I
The School of Hard Knocks: Combat Leadership in the
American Expeditionary Forces
By Richard S. Faulkner

Reviewed by Colonel Dean A. Nowowiejski, PhD, United States Army, Retired,
whose dissertation analyzed the American military governor of the Rhineland,
MG Henry T. Allen, who previously commanded the 90th Division in the AEF

W

ith The School of Hard Knocks, Shawn Faulkner has made a long
overdue and critical addition to the historiography of American
combat in World War I. He joins the recent contributions of Mark Ethan
Grotelueschen, The AEF Way of War: The American Army and Combat
in World War I; Edward G. Lengel, World War I Memories: An Annotated
Bibliography of Personal Accounts Published in English Since 1919 and To
Conquer Hell: The Meuse-Argonne, 1918, The Epic Battle That Ended the First
World War; and Mitch Yockelson, Borrowed Soldiers: Americans Under British
Command, 1918, in substantially expanding our understanding of just what
happened to the United States Army in World War I. Faulkner’s emphasis
is on the development and performance of small unit combat leaders
during World War I, and his analysis is so thorough, the ultimate story so
depressing for those who have led American soldiers, that the result is
compelling but tragic. Faulkner mines his sources thoroughly and excellently, and covers all aspects of junior combat leader development, from
training before commissioning through leadership of small units on the
battlefield. His focus is on captains, lieutenants, and sergeants at the tip
of the spear, principally infantry leaders of platoons and companies.
Faulkner’s exegesis really falls into two parts. The first is a very thorough
explanation of how combat leaders were selected, trained, and sent to
Europe. The second is about what happened to them when they arrived.
Faulkner begins by analyzing the legacy of officership in the
American Army leading into World War I. He lays bare the ineptitude
and class prejudice of the Regular officer corps, who were not prepared
for the rapid expansion of the Army, and imparted to officer trainees
pride in their rank and disdain for enlisted soldiers. Though Regulars
readily adopted the ideals of progressivism, they did not know how to
lead citizen soldiers in a mass Army. Similarly, the officer corps never
learned to overcome the inherent tension between initiative by subordinates and control by superiors. Control by senior officers won out, and
imaginative, competent junior leadership died.
This legacy passed through the various officer training programs
into the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF). Faulkner explores in
depth the commissioning programs, the Officer Training Camps (OTC)
and Central Officers’ Training Schools (COTS) that produced the bulk
of the infantry lieutenants for the AEF. He gets inside the life experience
of the recipient through cogent analysis of demographics of the training
population and schedules. Faulkner reveals that these programs produced
officers who really did not know what they were doing. The Army’s makeshift officer training system produced combat leaders neither technically
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nor tactically proficient because of shortages in instructors, equipment,
and facilities, exacerbated by flawed tactical doctrine.
Part of what makes this book unique is that Faulkner goes inside
the doctrinal literature of the time, successfully tracing important
evolutions in tactical concepts, but giving the explanation from the
standpoint of training’s effect on the receiver. He reveals the contradictory and confusing nature of the tactical doctrine of the AEF, beginning
with officer training stateside, and ending with updated concepts that
were attempted in the Meuse Argonne. What reveals is that there was
no uniform doctrine, formation, or common understanding for infantry companies and platoons regarding how to fight. One of his best
chapters is on the combat physics of World War I. To succeed would
have required infantry leaders who knew how to properly employ their
machine guns, mortars, and cannon as supporting weapons. They would
have had to adjust artillery while attacking, because this was what the
physics demanded. They did not possess the means to do so.
A principal contribution of this work is Faulkner’s ability to take
present-day understanding of what is required to lead men in combat,
and then details how American leadership in World War I failed to meet
those standards. What he reveals is what one would expect to contribute
to unit cohesion in forces today. Care for soldiers, identification and
respect between leader and led, common identity forged through shared
hardship, and simple leader competence, all failed in the American
forces. Incredible turbulence meant that American soldiers in combat
often did not even know who their officers were. The AEF’s elaborate
school system disrupted the development of unit cohesion while contributing little to tactical competence, as it robbed junior leaders from
units repeatedly and at the wrong time. Officers cared for themselves
before their men, and did not know the basics of leadership and tactics.
Fear of failure and a leadership climate where officers did NCO business
condemned all to failure. Faulkner lays bare the problem of straggling in
the AEF and why it existed. The end results of all these problems were
needless casualties while officers bungled to find their way toward the
basics of leadership.
Faulkner’s prose is clear and often elegant. His research is meticulous, and his explanations so thorough as to be sometimes exhausting. If
there is one salient suggestion for this work, it is that any future editions
will add a bibliographic essay so that the tale of how Faulkner mined his
sources and how he broke the code of variety and depth in World War
I materials can be told. He clearly is a master of the extensive literature
and source material. Most of the photographs in the book are from
the author’s personal collection. He must have collected these strikingly
appropriate images over time, and that in itself might be part of the
bibliographical tale.
This book is essential reading for professional Army officers because
of its revelations about flaws in our institution, for those with interest
in the history of leadership and World War I, and for national defense
policymakers to know what organizational mistakes never to repeat
when mobilizing the nation for war.
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The Romanian Battlefront in World War I

By Glenn E. Torrey
Reviewed by Colonel James D. Scudieri, Department of Military Strategy,
Plans, and Operations, US Army War College

T

his book, amongst a steady publication of Great War titles lately,
contributes to a far-less-studied theater among western works.
Historian Glenn E. Torrey pledged to present a balanced survey of military operations and events on the Romanian Front, as well as to showcase
the long-neglected Romanian Campaign in 1917. In seventeen chapters
plus epilogue and conclusion, he does so admirably.
The early chapters set the stage. There is sufficient background on
the Romanian state and pre-war politics. King Carol died in October
1914. His nephew Ferdinand generally has a reputation of being weak
and indecisive. He was quite aloof socially, the opposite of popular
Queen Marie, granddaughter of Queen Victoria and Tsar Alexander
II, and very pro-Entente. Given Ferdinand’s general reticence, Torrey
categorizes Premier Ion C. Brătianu as a virtual dictator.
The tightrope diplomacy in which a minor power had to balance key
interests and allies is a case study in its own right. Strained relations with
Russia from the 1880s over the loss of southern Bessarabia ultimately
did not trump the pre-eminent drive to acquire Transylvania with its
ethnic Romanians, territory in the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
The text provides a comprehensive assessment of the Romanian
Army, the military instrument to deliver the prize. Bloodied in the
recent Second Balkan War, it had some significant liabilities. There
was a top-heavy officer corps and a relatively weak noncommissioned
officer corps. More significantly, its training and doctrine had not benefitted from sophisticated, ongoing, comprehensive assessment on the
nature of the next war. There were few opportunities to incorporate the
painful experience of other armies during two years of war, 1914-16. A
weak industrial base precluded widespread force modernization (e.g.,
the proportion of machine guns, field, and heavy artillery). Convoluted
diplomacy often prevented imports to fill the void in any significant
numbers. Inadequate force modernization and levels were severe
constraints in an army built around massive (27,000 soldiers) infantry
divisions. Torrey assesses that mobilization was excessive. The navy
was essentially a riverine force for operations on the lower Danube; the
Austro-Hungarians dominated the upper Danube. The aviation service
was only a year old at the time of intervention in the war.
Planning highlighted the challenges from volatile diplomacy.
Romania was a secret member of the Triple Alliance from 1883 until
1913. Hence, war plans had focused against Russia. Concerted planning
for a war against Austria-Hungary began in the tumultuous summer of
crisis in 1914. Unsurprisingly, the main effort would be the northern
front, an attack northwest across the Carpathians into Transylvania.
The southern front, Romania’s recently-acquired Dobrogean region,
was secondary.
Romania’s road to war was long. The text reviews the two-year
neutrality, replete with a host of domestic issues and much diplomatic
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haggling. The chances that Romania would side with the Central Powers
were slim. The conditions of her entry still occupied the Allies for some
time. Ferdinand rose to the occasion; he essentially told the formal
Council that the country was going to war. Romania joined the Allies
in August 1916. A French Military Mission under General Henri M.
Berthelot would exercise a strong influence, along with Russian and
British advisors.
Despite long-running strategic challenges, Romania’s leaders
committed to the prosecution of a two-front war. Torrey covers these
operations very well, essentially a chapter for each major effort. The
Romanians achieved strategic and operational surprise and hence great,
initial success in their long-awaited, popular offensive into Transylvania.
The same was not the case for the Dobrogea to the south. Available
Romanian troops, an economy of force, were still committed to a forward
defense, with no plan to trade space for time. Combined operations with
the Russians proved difficult. Bulgarian elements attacked with the same
fervor which the Romanians demonstrated in Transylvania, seeing the
Dobrogea as long-lost, national lands.
There is comprehensive examination of the Romanians’ elementary, strategic choices in the fall of 1916 and their consequences. The
Romanians opted for an ambitious counteroffensive in the south, on
the Dobrogean front, known as the Flămânda Maneuver. It failed and
Central Power retribution was sweeping and swift. Romania faced
powerful, combined offensives. German Gen Erich von Falkenhayn led
Austro-Hungarian and German forces in the north, ejected Romanian
forces from Transylvania within forty days, and entered Romania proper.
To the south, German General August von Mackensen led German,
Bulgarian, and Turkish troops through the Dobrogea and into the heart
of Romania. He captured Bucharest on 6 December 1917.
Success for the Central Powers was neither easy nor cheap, but
they had broken the Romanian Army and shaken the nation state to its
foundations. Romania survived, but lost two-thirds of its territory and
vast resources, largely Wallachia besides the Dobrogea. Torrey reviews
the cost with some fascinating statistics, including casualties; lost equipment; and expropriated resources, especially grain and oil.
The Entente rallied to the aid of the rump Romanian state, a littleknown case study in building partner capacity quickly under adverse
circumstances. The text provides a thorough analysis of this reconstruction of the Romanian Army with thematic topics (e.g., reconstruction
[reorganization], epidemics, morale, instruction [training], and rearmament), backed by detailed statistics, all well documented. The Danube
fleet and aviation service received similar attention. The overwhelming
bulk of military trainers were French, with due recognition of national
and cultural clashes.
Romania fought with skill and determination in 1917, and Torrey
recounts these actions with flair in detail. Three major battles at Mărăşti,
Mărăşeşti, and Oituz between late July and early September stymied
complete enemy conquest. Romanian success had come with much
effective Russian help, despite the March Revolution. The Bolsheviks,
however, left Romania isolated and too weak to continue the war alone.
Romania agreed to an armistice at Focşani on 5 December 1917, yet
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provided “peace-keeping” forces to ensure order in the newly-declared
“Moldavian Republic” in Bessarabia. Further, tortuous negotiations
resulted in the “Preliminary Peace”of Buftea on 5 March 1918. The
Treaty of Bucharest followed on 5 May.
The events of 1918 were no less amazing than the last two years.
Domestic and external events reflected complex chaos. Romanian
leaders struggled to achieve some unity and maintain national spirit with
viable institutions. They conformed to treaty obligations to concede
only minimums as late as possible. Accommodation rested upon realistic
pragmatism, not a genuine spirit of cooperation. Army demobilization,
perforce gradual, did not preclude the preservation of a properlyequipped core. Somewhat hesitantly and at the proverbial eleventh hour,
Romania mobilized formally on 9 November 1918 and reentered the war
on the side of the Allies on 10 November, less than twenty-four hours
before the armistice took effect on the Western Front. The King and
Queen returned to Bucharest five days short of the two-year anniversary
of von Mackensen’s triumphant entry.
American readers tend to focus on that Armistice and the Treaty of
Versailles, but the Great War required many more armistices and treaties
to end conflict around the world. Indeed, fighting continued. Moreover,
even major combat operations in the region had very much been for,
with, and among the people. Romanian troops now fought to stem the
rising tide of Bolshevism from a broken Russia amidst the breakup of
the Hapsburg empire and the receding tide of a defeated Germany, and
within the context of a web of multitudes of ethnic tensions. Romania’s
major effort was against the new Soviet republic declared in Hungary by
Béla Kun. While balancing constantly-changing diplomatic imperatives,
Romania advanced all the way to Budapest, taking the Hungarian capital
on 3 August 1919.
Romania’s war had been a painful see-saw between ecstatic victory
and abject defeat, but the Treaty of Trianon in March 1920 nearly doubled
the country’s territory and population. Romanian diplomats had argued
vociferously for the Allies to honor the promises from 1916. The Army
had been the key instrument to achievement.
Torrey’s monograph is a major case study in the constant exchange
between politicians and generals, and how they wielded landpower to
accomplish well-known, long-held, and ambitious policy goals. Torrey
tells this story carefully and well. His mastery of Romanian sources was
already well established; he consulted French and German materials,
along with very select British and American, as well. The selection of
photos laced throughout complements the text most effectively. The
style of maps, many adapted, can be rather busy, but they are important.
This work represents a commendable effort to recount a forgotten front
and close a long-incomplete account.
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Insights from Political Science
Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity,
and Poverty
By Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson

Reviewed by Janeen Klinger, Professor of Political Science, who teaches a
seminar on nation-building at the US Army War College

T

he causes of political instability and state failure have become
growing concerns for strategic leaders and national security professionals because the United States is much more likely to deploy force in
countries experiencing such conditions than to engage a peer competitor
in a conventional war. The authors of Why Nations Fail provide a compelling explanation for state failure that is all the more rare because it has
value for both practitioners and scholars of national security. The good
news to be derived from the authors’ thesis is that problems associated
with state failure need not be viewed with a sense of fatalism because the
causes do not grow from some immutable material factor like geography
or ethnicity, but rather are manmade. The bad news is that the causes
of instability lie with institutional configurations which, while manmade,
can prove intractable. Consequently, the prospects for successful stability
and nation-building operations may be quite slim. The authors begin to
support their thesis by comparing conditions between Nogales, Arizona,
and Nogales, Mexico, to show that neither geography nor ethnicity can
account for differences. The value of the analysis provided by the authors
for both the academic and policymaking audience will become apparent
from the following summary of their thesis and the evidence they use
to support it.
The authors begin by noting that today’s successful states share
common institutional configurations that they label inclusive. In the
economic realm, inclusive institutions include such things as a patent
system and a guarantee of property rights which, among other things,
encourage investment and innovation thereby laying the basis for economic growth and generalized prosperity. Inclusive political institutions
are those characterized by a pluralism that ensures power is constrained
and broadly diffused. The interaction between inclusive economic and
political institutions generates a self-reinforcing virtuous circle. Because
prosperity is generalized throughout the social system, no single group
has an incentive for concentrating political power in its own hands to
perpetuate its rule. The evolution of the United States illustrates the
consequences of inclusive political and economic institutions.
In contrast, today’s weak and potentially unstable states are those
with institutional configurations that the authors label as extractive. As
the label itself suggests, extractive economic institutions are predatory in
the extent to which they concentrate and channel wealth into the hands
of a narrow elite. Because such extractive economic institutions create
wide disparities in wealth, the elites have little interest in investment or
innovations that diffuse prosperity in a way that jeopardizes their affluence. Examples of extractive economic institutions include grants of
monopoly or serf-based agriculture. In a setting where wealth becomes
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excessively concentrated, political control is necessary to protect economic interests, so elites will resist any pressure for broadening political
participation. Therefore, extractive economic arrangements are reinforced by extractive political institutions generating an interaction that
creates a self-reinforcing vicious circle where wealth is channeled toward
one narrow elite that has too much to lose by expanding political power
to other groups. The evolution of Hispanic America with the legacy of
the encomienda system introduced by the conquistadors illustrates the
consequences of extractive institutions.
But what accounts for the origin of institutional configurations in
the first place? Here the authors introduce historical contingency with
the notion that key events—or critical junctures in their terminology—
interact with existing conditions that may mutate institutions in the
direction of inclusive or extractive ones. One example of a critical juncture that affected institutional development in Europe was the Black
Death. The plague, which significantly reduced populations and therefore the labor supply, was a major factor contributing to the divergence
of institutions in Western and Eastern Europe. In the West, there was
a gradual dissolution of feudalism’s reliance on serf-based agriculture
while in the East, labor shortages led elites to double down on extractive arrangements. Another example of a critical juncture and one with
far-reaching consequences for conditions today, was European colonialism that, as the authors point out, left a legacy of extractive institutions
throughout the world.
While the analysis provided in the book contains some repetition in
elaboration of the thesis, the reader who is patient working through it
will be rewarded by the extensive variety of examples the authors use to
illustrate their thesis. The examples range from the ancient world of the
Aztecs and Romans to the western revolutions in England and France,
providing a rich historical narrative. Other examples focus on countries
of current policy concern like Somalia and China. The reader will come
away from the book with a greater historical appreciation of the processes of economic and political development and an understanding of
the relevance of historical experience for countries facing development
challenges today.
Although a brief book review cannot do justice to the many nuances
in the theory presented, this book’s ultimate strength lies with the fact
that it is valuable for both scholar and practitioner. From a scholarly
standpoint, the book is broadly comparative in a mode that is rarely
attempted today. As such, the authors combine the best of a social
science approach in an effort to derive generalizations that apply across
time and space with the best of history through their recognition of the
role of contingency. Moreover, the authors incorporate concepts from
some classic social science like Robert Michels’ notion of the iron law
of oligarchy and Joseph Schumpeter’s idea of “creative destruction” as
a reminder of the lasting value of older scholarship. For the national
security professional, the book offers a caution about using their framework to make predictions or policy prescriptions. Despite the fact that
the analysis does not provide a handbook for those engaged in nationbuilding operations, it goes a long way toward explaining the contours
of today’s world.
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Days of Decision: Turning Points in U.S. Foreign Policy
By Micheal Nojeim and David Kilroy

Reviewed by COL Joel R. Hillison, Ph.D., Director of First Year Studies,
Department of Distance Education, US Army War College

R

eaders who enjoyed America’s First Battles as junior officers will
find value and a tinge of nostalgia in a recent book by Micheal
Nojeim and David Kilroy. Their book, Days of Decision, is an interesting
compilation of key turning points in US foreign policy and a refreshing
contribution to the literature on US foreign policy and security studies.
The book covers twelve turning points in US foreign policy, from the
sinking of the Maine to the 11 September 2001, terrorist attacks.
The thesis of the book is that, over the last century, sudden crises
or major policy initiatives have significantly altered the direction
of foreign policy. While this is not a startling revelation, the authors
extrapolate four hypotheses from this position. First, they make the
point that political and historical context matter. Nojeim and Kilroy
do a nice job of setting the political, historical, and strategic context in
each of the case studies examined. Second, they suggest that foreign
policy is usually left to the elites until a crisis brings US foreign policy
into the domestic spotlight. For example, the Arab-Israeli War and subsequent oil embargo in 1973 turned America’s attention to the Middle
East, where it has been fixated ever since. Until that crisis, the public
was generally ambivalent about the region. Third, while elections are
primarily determined by domestic issues, a president’s historic legacy
is most often determined by foreign policy triumphs or failures. (The
most glaring exception in the book was the 1968 election, in which the
Tet Offensive and civil unrest in the United States doomed Johnson’s
prospects for re-election.) Finally, the authors present the argument that
foreign policy debates among top ranking governmental officials are an
integral component of major policy shifts, thus dispelling the rationalist
notion that states are monolithic entities that act on well-defined power
interests. In fact, these debates demonstrate that interests and policy are
often contested. These four hypotheses are addressed in each of the case
studies examined in the book (the sinking of the Maine, the Lusitania
crisis, the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Korean War, the Sputnik crisis,
the Cuban missile crisis, the Tet Offensive, the United States opening
to China, the Arab-Israeli War, the Islamic revolution in Iran, the fall
of the Berlin wall, and the attacks of 11 September 2001). The case
studies were selected because they sparked considerable debate within
the government, brought foreign policy into the national spotlight, and
led to a significant change in the direction of US foreign policy.
Perhaps the most relevant case study for contemporary strategists
deals with the opening of relations with China. The authors provide a
nice summary of the historic tensions between the United States and
China. The authors also make the point that President Nixon’s previous
anticommunist stance gave him the domestic credibility to pursue closer
relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Through a series
of well-timed signals and progressive concessions, President Nixon and
his administration were able to mend fences with a seemingly implacable
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foe, dramatically changing the global strategic environment and establishing the foundation for future cooperation ultimately facilitating our
close (albeit wary) economic relationship with China today. While there
was no definitive crisis bringing this change in foreign policy about,
Nixon was able to move his new China policy into the domestic spotlight, first through an unlikely interaction with China (ping-pong) and
then through Nixon’s high visibility, election year visit to China. This
was a key achievement in the president’s tarnished legacy.
For policymakers and strategists looking for an alternative to the
ongoing containment of Iran, the China case holds some hopeful
parallels. The crisis in Syria and growing isolation of Iran due to its
nuclear activities might provide a permissive environment for both the
United States and Iran to reassess their current policies. The American
public is focused on continuing domestic economic issues and weary
of tremendous expenditures of blood and treasury in both Afghanistan
and Iraq. This environment echoes the public mood of exhaustion and
mistrust of the government in the aftermath of the Tet Offensive. The
US withdrawal from Iraq, and pending departure from Afghanistan,
might also ease Iranian suspicions and provide them with some domestic political space for compromise. Reaching a strategic accommodation
with Iran would enable the United States to conserve scarce military
and economic resources and invest them more productively in Asia, just
as the breakthrough with China in the aftermath of Vietnam allowed
the United States to restore its international reputation and permitted a
more intense strategic focus on the Soviet Union.
While insightful and well-written, the individual hypotheses are
not particularly new to the study of foreign policy. For example, most
practitioners understand that political and historic context matter when
foreign policy is being decided. (This was a theme throughout the
America’s First Battles case studies as well.) It is also not a revelation
that domestic politics often trumps foreign policy during election cycles,
nor that foreign policy often determines a president’s legacy. That said,
this book is an instructive review of turning points in US foreign policy.
It provides a well-reasoned framework for analyzing current crises and
preparing for potential shifts in policy direction. The four hypotheses
provide a logical framework for assessing our current strategic pivot
towards Asia, or our response to the global financial crisis. This book
is worth reading for foreign policy enthusiasts and senior political and
military leaders who are struggling to develop effective policies and
strategies during times of crisis.
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The Human Face of War
Voices of the Bulge: Untold Stories from Veterans of the Battle
of the Bulge
By Michael Collins and Martin King

Reviewed by Colonel James R. Oman, USA Ret., Director, Senior Service
College Fellowship Program, Defense Acquisition University, Aberdeen
Proving Ground, Maryland

T

he exceedingly popular genre, characterized by a collection of veterans recounting their personal experiences accrued during the course
of a particular operation or campaign as exemplified by Voices of the Bulge:
Untold Stories from Veterans of the Battle of the Bulge is clearly coming to an
end. The US Department of Veterans Affairs estimated that 740 World
War II veterans perished on average each day in 2011. Stated another way,
approximately 270,000 veterans are believed to have died in 2011 with a
projection of 248,000 or 679 veterans expected to die per day in 2012.
At the end of World War II, there were 16 million members in uniform.
At the beginning of 2012 these numbers dwindled to an estimated 2.9
million survivors, with the youngest in their mid-80s. I suspect this epic
tome represents one of the last of its kind as the relentless passage of
time silences their once vibrant voices.
Authors Martin King and Michael Collins spent more than a decade
conducting interviews, walking the ground throughout the Ardennes
region, and completing their research. The data they collected would
become the Voices of the Bulge. Their work provides fresh insight into this
massive, pivotal battle that was fought throughout Belgium from the
middle of December 1944 through the end of January 1945. King is a
military historian, serves as a lecturer, and is a consultant for the History
Channel. He currently lives in Belgium. Undoubtedly, his many visits to
the battlefield as a tour guide for groups of veterans, military members,
dignitaries, and the like have deepened his understanding of the ebb and
flow of the battle as well as contributed to his extensive research. Collins
lives in Connecticut, serves as a historical interpreter and museum
staffer for the Veterans Research Center and four museums. Collins also
has a familial tie to the battle through his grandfather who fought in
World War II while serving as a member of Patton’s Third Army within
the European Theater of Operations. The motivation to see where his
grandfather fought inspired him and his parents to visit the Ardennes
in June 2006. As luck would have it, their tour guide was King. The
seeds planted during this chance meeting inspired a partnership that
flourished and produced this epic tale. Their work honors those who
did not survive the conflagration as well as veterans living and deceased.
The massive German counteroffensive, code name Wacht am Rhein
(Watch on the Rhine), is often called the Von Rundstedt Offensive or
the Ardennes Counteroffensive; however, it is most commonly referred
to as the Battle of the Bulge by Americans and the British. This operation represented Adolf Hitler’s strategic gamble to reverse Germany’s
fortunes and stave off defeat by fracturing and destroying the Allied
forces advancing from the West. Hitler struck through the Ardennes

Minneapolis: Zenith Press,
2011
314 pages
$29.00

102

Parameters 42(4)/43(1) Winter-Spring 2013

for a variety of reasons, not the least of which was his hope to replicate
his earlier successes, specifically those events that occurred in May 1940,
when a similar dash led to the capitulation of France and the evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force from the Continent. Germany
would throw more than 200,000 soldiers assigned to 14 infantry and five
panzer divisions into the fray. These forces were supported by more than
1,600 artillery pieces and nearly 1,000 tanks as they attacked westward
across an 80-mile front. Ultimately, more than 600,000 American soldiers would be involved in the ensuing response that unfolded over the
upcoming thirty plus days. The US forces would sustain nearly 90,000
casualties—killed, wounded, and missing. The Battle of the Bulge was
the largest operation, with the most casualties, in the long history of the
US Army.
Collins and King recount day-to-day actions, reactions, and
responses. They begin with the opening German salvos on 16 December
1944 as the Germans attacked across the weakly held Belgian front and
conclude with the reduction of the Bulge and stabilization of the front
at the end of January 1945. The vast majority of the book is focused on
the first twelve days of the battle. The authors use a variety of sources
to recount the daily operations and allocate one chapter for each day of
the battle through 27 December 1944. The recollections, vivid accounts,
and dramatic descriptions of the fighting provided by the veterans, more
than 60-plus years after the fact, indelibly illustrate the highly personal
human dimension and lasting impact on each participant. The accounts
come primarily from US Army soldiers, both enlisted and officers; a
handful of Belgian civilians; and a few German soldiers. The manuscript
concludes with a brief review of events from 28 December 1944 through
the end of January 1945, a time frame which the authors aptly call “The
End Game.”
Prominently featured in the book are numerous firsthand accounts
shared by a diverse collection of veterans, many of whom demonstrated extraordinary feats of courage, as they fought in the Battle of
the Bulge. Several of these veterans are Lieutenant Colonel (Retired)
James “Maggie” Megellas, who fought as a member of H Company, 3rd
Battalion 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division
in Italy, Holland, Belgium, and Germany, and is recognized as the most
decorated officer in the history of the Division; Francis Curry, a Medal
of Honor recipient and a member of the 30th Infantry Division who was
recognized for his heroic stand near Malmedy on 21 December 1944;
and Ted Paluch, who as a member of the 285th Field Artillery Battalion
was one of a mere handful of survivors from the infamous Malmedy
Massacre, to name just a few.
Adding to the richness of the Voices of the Bulge are the more than 90
black and white photos taken at the time of the fighting or in its immediate aftermath, five detailed maps, and several biographical sketches.
One relatively unique feature is the inclusion of a 47-minute DVD that
accompanies the book. The DVD highlights Paluch, Megellas, Curry,
and several other veterans and provides the “voice” to go along with
their stories and pictures found within the text.
While the events of the Battle of the Bulge have been examined and
written about by many, Collins’ and King’s approach of having veterans
share their highly emotional experiences both honors and records the
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deeds of their service as these members of the Greatest Generation fade
onto the pages of history. As such, Voices of the Bulge: Untold Stories from
Veterans of the Battle of the Bulge is worthy of a thoughtful read.

What It Is Like To Go To War
By Karl Marlantes

Reviewed by Henry G. Gole, whose biography of Colonel Truman Smith, the
military attaché in Berlin, 1935-39, to be published in the Spring of 2013 by
the University Press of Kentucky

K

arl Marlantes wrote the bestseller and prize winning novel Matterhorn,
based on his experiences as a Marine Corps platoon commander in a
rifle company in Vietnam in 1969-70. In his nonfiction, What It Is Like To
Go To War, he takes his readers back to that time and place and to the four
succeeding decades in which he examined his conscience and came to
terms with killing and reentering civil society. This absolutely unique and
lucid personal account and analysis will be read with profit by scholars,
general readers, and most particularly, by veterans of close combat.
Note that Marlantes is very specific in defining just what he means
by “close combat”: close enough to throw a hand grenade at a foe or
to fire a rifle at another human being the shooter can see. Clarity on
this point is important to him and essential to the book. Laymen tend
to lump all Vietnam veterans in one heap. Those who have engaged in
close combat do not. In a “combat zone” there are relatively safe places.
A rifle company is not one of them.
The author is qualified by experience, education, temperament, and
skill as a writer to make penetrating observations. Many are graphic,
bold, and shocking. Some are erudite; some are ethereal; all are worthy
of careful consideration.
Maturation from the late 1950s and into the 1960s cultivated two
strains in his personality constantly visible in his writing. One is an
intellectual appetite fed in his Yale and Oxford years and demonstrated
on almost every page of the book. The other is an aspiration to join
King Arthur’s court of noble men—or to accompany Don Quixote on
a quest—manifest in both his choice of military service and his display
of courage in Vietnam.
He tells us that he wrote the book to come to terms with his experience of close combat. That could have been accomplished in a personal
journal, but he believes he might help other combat veterans “integrate
their combat experiences into their current lives.” He also thinks he
might provide young people contemplating joining the military “with
a psychological and spiritual combat prophylactic, for indeed combat
is like unsafe sex in that it’s a major thrill with possible horrible consequences.” (He is too wise to expect young men to read and heed his
advice.) Finally, he wants policymakers to know what they are asking of
the young.
His method is to reflect on a point important to him, to illustrate it
with an anecdote or a combat experience, and to mull it over in sparkling
prose that has the reader hanging on every word. His chapter headings
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identify themes: “Temple of Mars,” “Killing,” “Guilt,” “Numbness
and Violence,” “The Enemy Within,” “Lying,” “Loyalty,” “Heroism.”
The concluding three chapters indicate his concern for the need to integrate the earlier violence into current lives: “Home,” “The Club,” and
“Relating to Mars.”
Mastery of our language and the creative use of poetic devices and
images make his pronouncements memorable. To illustrate: Asking warriors to “adjust” to home after close combat “is akin to asking Saint
John of the Cross to be happy flipping hamburgers at McDonald’s after
he’s left the monastery.” And regarding military training: “Boot camp
doesn’t turn young men into killers. It removes the societal restraints on
the savage part of us that has made us the top animal in the food chain.”
His title might have been "What It Is Like To Return From War."
He writes that it was ten years after killing a man that he felt any emotion
about it. Then deep remorse lasted months, a pattern for the next three
decades. He knows that warriors must learn how to integrate the experience of killing, to put the pieces of their psyches back together again.
But, “It is unfortunate that the guilt and mourning reside almost entirely
with those asked to do the dirty work.” He believes that “drugs, alcohol,
and suicides are ways of avoiding guilt and fear of grief. Grief itself
is a healthy response.” Those called upon to fight violate many codes
of civilized behavior. They must come to terms with stepping outside
conventional behavior. He cites T. E. Lawrence (Seven Pillars of Wisdom,
1922): “What now looks wanton or sadic seemed in the field inevitable,
or just unimportant routine.” Then a truism in his own words: “The
least acknowledged aspect of war, today, is how exhilarating it is.”
This reviewer gives this book very high marks. The most comparable works are philosopher and World War II veteran J. Glenn Gray’s
The Warriors: Reflections on Men In Battle and professor of English and WW
II veteran Samuel Hynes’ The Soldiers’ Tale: Bearing Witness to Modern War,
both of the highest quality. A small sample of other first-rate accounts
of close combat and the reactions of warriors are commended—from
WW I: Graves, Goodbye to All That, a memoir; Remarque, All Quiet on the
Western Front, a novel constantly in print since 1929; and from WW II:
Sledge, With the Old Breed; Fraser, Quartered Safe Out Here; Masters, The
Road Past Mandalay; Fussell, The Boys’ Crusade; from the French war in
Indo-China: Grauwin, Doctor at Dien Bien Phu, and from the American
war in Vietnam: Nolen, Ripcord.
Another small sample of books dealing with shell shock, battle
fatigue, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)—whatever name is
given the after-effects of the combat experience on young psyches—is
particularly appropriate at this time. It would include these from WW
I: Moran, Anatomy of Courage; Barker, Regeneration; Remarque, The Road
Back; from WW II: Manchester, Goodbye Darkness; from Vietnam: Shay,
Achilles in Vietnam.
One deeply regrets the current clear need to understand what it is
like to go to war and what it is like to return from war. Karl Marlantes has
joined a short list of authors whose experience, sensitivity, and skill enable
them to share wisdom with those among us who would understand.

